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Post-Watergate: The Legal Profession and 
Respect for the Interests of Third Parties 
Laurel A. Rigertas* 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of Watergate, disciplinary proceedings were brought 
against at least twenty-nine lawyers, which resulted in disciplinary action 
against at least eighteen of them.1  Their misconduct included aiding and 
abetting burglary, obstruction of justice, perjury, violation of campaign 
laws and conspiracy to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, among other 
charges.2  As a result of lawyers’ involvement in Watergate, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) worked to improve ethical standards for lawyers to 
rehabilitate the profession’s tarnished reputation.  The ABA’s reform 
efforts included the enactment of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“Model Rules”) in 1983 and the adoption of a requirement that all ABA 
accredited law schools provide legal ethics education.3  Subsequent events 
involving lawyers, however, should cause the legal profession to question 
whether these reforms adequately help lawyers navigate their often 
competing roles while maintaining the trust and respect of the public that is 
necessary to sustain our legal system. 
There are many lenses through which one can view the events of 
Watergate.4  This article, however, suggests that much of the conduct of the 
 
 *Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University, College of Law; J.D. University of Minnesota; B.S. 
James Madison University.  I would like to thank the Chapman Law Review for the opportunity to 
speak at their symposium, The 40th Anniversary of Watergate: A Commemoration of the Rule of Law.  
I also want to thank Daniel S. Reynolds and Ronald D. Rotunda for their comments on an earlier draft 
and Bryant Storm and Lindsay Vanek for their research assistance. 
 1 N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges against Twenty-Nine Lawyers, 62 
A.B.A. J. 1337 (Oct. 1976). 
 2 Infra Part I.B. 
 3 Infra Part II.D. 
 4 See, e.g., Arnold Rochvarg, Enron, Watergate and the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 43 
WASHBURN L.J. 61, 61 (2003) (looking at Watergate as concerning the role of an attorney for an 
organization when the attorney learns of misconduct by those acting for the organization); Fred D. 
Thompson, One  Lawyer’s  Perspective  on  Watergate, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 226, 226 (1974) (viewing the 
events of Watergate as generating precedents that will govern the future relationship of the executive 
and legislative branches); Richard D. Schwartz, After Watergate, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 4 (1973) 
(seeing  the  events  of  Watergate  as  illustrating  “the  danger  that  governmental  use  of  information  control  
can threaten freedom of choice in the political process”);;   John  Blake,  Forgetting a Key Lesson from 
Watergate?, CNN.com (Feb. 4, 2012),  http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/04/politics/ 
watergate-reform/index.html?iref=allsearch (viewing Watergate as a campaign finance scandal). 
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lawyers who were disciplined as a result of Watergate violated the interests 
of third parties, which included both individuals5 and the broader 
community.6  If the lawyers had been trained and sensitized to assess the 
impact of their conduct on the interests of third parties, perhaps some of 
them would have paused and considered their choices more carefully.  
Instead, many of them seemed to have pursued the interests of their client 
or superior zealously and without any consideration of the impact on third 
parties.7  Viewing the conduct of the lawyers through this lens may help 
inform our understanding of subsequent events where the public has felt 
betrayed by lawyers’ conduct.  The conduct of lawyers frequently has 
serious and foreseeable consequences on third parties that are a byproduct 
of zealous advocacy.  This outcome is frequently proper in our adversarial 
system, but sometimes it is not.  The public’s disdain for the legal 
profession is particularly acute in these circumstances.8 
Thus, forty years after Watergate, the legal profession should question 
whether it adequately inculcates in lawyers not only respect for the rule of 
law but also, specifically, respect for the interests of third parties.  This is 
not to suggest that a lawyer will, or should, frequently allow consideration 
of a third party’s interests to trump the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to his or her 
client.  Indeed, the proper execution of a lawyer’s duties will often demand 
the lawyer put his or her client’s interests first, even when it harms the 
interests of others. 
That conclusion, however, should not preclude a lawyer, who is an 
agent of justice in addition to being an advocate, from routinely assessing 
the consequences of his or her conduct on the interests of third parties.  
Perhaps through that viewpoint some misconduct could be averted.  
Furthermore, even when a lawyer concludes that the law properly demands 
action of him or her that will harm the interests of third parties, this 
reflection may allow the lawyer to discuss with the client not just what the 
law allows, but the moral implications of taking a legally permissible 
course of action; in other words, to advise the client on the right thing to 
do.  These moments of reflection may also allow for important 
consideration of whether the law as written has struck the right balance 
between loyalty to one’s client and the interests in justice, or whether 
reform is necessary.  Lastly, if the public viewed lawyers as a group that is 
 
 5 See infra notes 93, 96 and accompanying text. 
 6 See, e.g., In the Matter of Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (suspending attorney 
Claude Wild from the practice of law for one year following his conviction for violating campaign 
finance laws and quoting the sentencing judge who noted that the crime may be one worse than a crime 
of  violence  because  it  “is  corrupting  our  government”). 
 7 Infra Part I.B. 
 8 See John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts Into Legal 
Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 323, 333 (2008) 
(lack of civility and overly aggressive tactics may not necessarily be ethical violations but the public 
frequently views them harshly and with distaste). 
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constantly mindful of how its conduct affects other people, that perspective 
may aid in improving the public’s opinion of the legal profession. 
No single reform can likely instill in lawyers a routine practice of 
assessing how their actions impact third parties and how to include the 
interests of third parties in the framework they use to assess difficult ethical 
situations.  Instead, a variety of reforms would probably be required to 
create such a cultural shift.  This article suggests two areas of reform for 
consideration: the Model Rules and legal education. 
The Model Rules and its predecessors, the 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics and the 1969 Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, articulate a need for lawyers to comply with the rule of law 
during their representation of clients, as well as in their personal affairs.9  
Each of these guidelines clearly prohibited the violation of the criminal 
laws that many of the lawyers involved in Watergate committed.10  The 
Model Rules and its predecessors also all contain provisions that expressly 
or implicitly are concerned with the rights of third parties in some specific 
situations, such as a lawyer’s duty not to make false statements of material 
fact to third parties.11  However, neither the Model Rules nor its 
predecessors contain a broad principle that a lawyer’s ethical decision-
making framework should be informed, at least in part, by the impact of the 
lawyer’s conduct on the interests of third parties.  Such a principle could be 
included in the Model Rules, probably not as a standard for disciplinary 
enforcement, but as a general guiding principle such as those set forth in 
the Preamble. 
Next, legal education can help future lawyers develop an analytical 
framework to consider ethical dilemmas, in part, through the perspective of 
third parties.  Increasingly, legal ethics education has used a problem-based 
pedagogy to put ethical dilemmas in context and to give students the 
opportunity to assess problems from different roles, such as lawyer, client, 
third-party neutral and judge.12  Such roles could also include third parties 
impacted by lawyers’ conduct, which could broaden the perspective 
through which ethical problems are viewed and analyzed.  Additionally, 
legal ethics education may benefit from the growing dialogue about 
developing the emotional intelligence of law students and lawyers.  
Emotional intelligence includes developing empathy for others and an 
understanding of their perspective, which could be valuable to legal ethics 
education.13 
Legal education can also help train lawyers to do a better job of 
educating their clients about the role of lawyers and the limits on their role.  
 
 9 Infra Part II.B–D. 
 10 Infra Part II.B–D. 
 11 Infra Part II.B–D. 
 12 Infra Part IV.B. 
 13 Infra Part IV.B. 
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The conduct of the actors involved in Watergate has, in many instances, 
been explained by the context in which the actors were placed—
specifically the White House and all of its power and prestige.14  There is 
undoubtedly some truth to that explanation, but it would be an 
overstatement to say that the motivations of the actors were unique to that 
powerful setting.  In today’s competitive business world, private attorneys 
must compete vigorously to retain their clients’ business or risk losing 
income and frequently job security.  This can create incredible pressure to 
satisfy the demands of clients, who are not bound by the professional rules 
of ethics and frequently are not even interested in hearing about them.15  
Thus, lawyers need to do a better job of communicating with their clients 
about the limits of their role.  No matter which lawyer a client sees, that 
client should hear a clear and consistent message that the lawyer is not 
there to win at all costs, but to advocate for the client within the parameters 
of the facts and the law, while treating third parties with dignity and 
respect. 
Part I of this article gives a brief overview of Watergate and focuses 
on the specific conduct of some of the lawyers who were disciplined.  Part 
II of this article gives an overview of the history the American Bar 
Association’s efforts to codify ethical rules including the promulgation of 
the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Part III will discuss post-
Watergate events involving lawyers that have impaired the public’s trust of 
the profession, which suggest there is still room for improvement.  Lastly, 
Part IV will discuss possible reforms to the Model Rules and legal 
education that could help instill in lawyers a principle of evaluating the 
impact of their conduct on third parties as a routine part of legal practice 
and ethical decision-making. 
I.  WATERGATE  
A. A General Overview 
While the events that comprise what is now referred to collectively as 
“Watergate” are extensive, this article will only briefly outline some of the 
events to provide context for a more detailed exploration of the actions of 
some of the individual lawyers involved in Watergate.  The epicenter of 
Watergate occurred on June 17, 1972, when five men were arrested at the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices located in the Watergate 
Hotel.16  This break-in was part of a broader campaign strategy devised by 
Nixon and his aides aimed at attacking Nixon’s Democratic opponent in the 
 
 14 Infra Part III. 
 15 Infra Part III. 
 16 Tad Szulc, Democratic Raid Tied to Realtor, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1972, at 1; SAM J. ERVIN, 
JR., THE WHOLE TRUTH: THE WATERGATE CONSPIRACY 7 (1980). 
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1972 campaign.17  This strategy included bugging the offices of the DNC in 
order to obtain political intelligence.18 
The men arrested on June 17, 1992, were James McCord, who was 
working for the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP)19 and four 
Cubans.20  Those involved in planning and authorizing the break-in 
included Gordon Liddy (a lawyer), Jeb Magruder, and John Mitchell, the 
former U.S. Attorney General who had left that post to work for CRP and 
take over the management of Nixon’s re-election campaign.21 The break-in 
occurred just months before Nixon won the 1972 election by a landslide for 
a second term.22  The events that collectively comprise “Watergate,” 
however, span the years before and after the break-in. 
In many ways, the story of Watergate began in 1971, when The New 
York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret study 
regarding the Vietnam War, which Daniel Ellsberg had leaked to the 
press.23  Responding to this leak, the White House formed the “Plumbers,” 
a group tasked with plugging information leaks.24  Members of the 
“Plumbers” included Egil “Bud” Krogh (a lawyer), G. Gordon Liddy (a 
lawyer) and Howard Hunt, a former employee of the Central Intelligence 
Agency.25 
The “Plumbers” sought to discredit Daniel Ellsberg’s character and 
mental stability, which was the motivation behind a burglary of the offices 
of Dr. Fielding, Ellsberg’s psychiatrist.26  Members of the “Plumbers,” 
including Krogh authorized the burglary, which was carried out by a team 
that included Liddy, Hunt and four Cubans.27  It was these same four 
Cubans who, along with James McCord, (McCord was working for CRP), 
subsequently broke into the DNC offices at Watergate.28  This fact, in large 
part, appears to have motivated Nixon and the White House’s cover-up of 
the Watergate break-in.29  While direct ties between CRP’s Watergate 
break-in and the White House were weak, the ties between the White 
House and the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office were stronger; this made 
 
 17 ERVIN, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 18 Id. at 5. 
 19 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 61–62. 
 20 ERVIN, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
 21 Id. at 4, 40. 
 22 Id. at  10   (“President  Nixon  was   returned to the White House over his Democratic opponent, 
Senator   George   S.  McGovern,   by   a   landslide   victory   in   which   he   received   520   of   the   nation’s   538  
electoral votes and 60.8 percent of  its  popular  votes.”). 
 23 Id. at 120. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 105–06, 120. 
 26 Id. at 106. 
 27 JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE END OF THE STORY 506–10 (2009); see N.O.B.C. 
Reports, supra note 1, at 1337 (listing lawyers who were involved in Watergate-related activities). 
 28 DEAN, supra note 27, at 101–02; ERVIN, supra note 16, at 10. 
 29 See infra note 31. 
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the President vulnerable to being implicated in wrongdoing.30  Because 
four of the men involved in the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office were taken 
into custody and faced criminal charges for the Watergate break-in, the 
President’s administration apparently perceived a threat that those men 
would disclose information about the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office and 
the role of the White House, as part of a plea bargain.31  And thus, the 
Watergate cover-up began. 
Concerns about additional leaks also caused Nixon to want to obtain 
Morton Halperin’s papers from the Brookings Institute because there were 
reports that those papers would extend the Pentagon Papers into the time 
frame of Nixon’s administration.32  Breaking in and stealing the papers was 
not feasible because they were believed to be in a very secure vault inside 
the building.33  Nixon’s Special Counsel, Chuck Colson (a lawyer),34 
proposed a plan to firebomb the Brookings Institute to create chaos and 
provide an opportunity to gain access to the facility.35  This plan was 
abandoned after White House Counsel John Dean raised an objection to 
it.36  While Dean’s intervention stopped this plan, instead of viewing 
Dean’s objections as wise counsel, some of the President’s inner circle 
viewed him as having some “little old lady” in him.37  In other words, those 
in power seemed to send a message that the people ready and willing to do 
the President’s bidding should not feel constrained by the law. 
The combination of the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins set the stage 
for the events after the Watergate break-in, when the White House and 
many individuals associated with it engaged in cover-up activities38 that 
would result in a multitude of criminal charges.39  These events, and others, 
arose in an environment in which the White House and the presidency were 
 
 30 Nixon never admitted to knowing about the Ellsberg break-in prior to March 1973—eighteen 
months after the break-in occurred. FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 210 (1994). However his close aides were apparently 
never sure of this, and were concerned that he could be implicated. See DEAN, supra note 27, at 240–41, 
314–16. 
 31 DEAN, supra note 27, at 101–06. 
 32 Id. at 43. “Although  the  Pentagon  Papers  did  not  deal  directly  with  the  Nixon  administration,  
the president believed that publishing the papers would undermine his efforts to control Vietnam 
policy.”  MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE WATERGATE CRISIS 15 (1999). 
 33 DEAN, supra note 27, at 43. 
 34 See infra notes 66, 67 and accompanying text. 
 35 DEAN, supra note 27, at 43. 
 36 Id. at 43–46. 
 37 Id. at 46.  
 38 Id. at 532–36.  John Dean wrote:   
Bud  Krogh’s   explanation   as   to  why   the   cover-up occurred—that the Ellsberg-related 
burglary was at the core of the cover-up—is correct, at least as far as the White House 
was concerned.  This fact was well understood by all who were involved in the cover-
up, although it has been left to only Bud and myself to acknowledge it, since Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman, and Mitchell went to their graves either pretending they did not understand 
why the cover-up occurred or denied that anything untoward had, in fact, happened. 
Id. at 529. 
 39 Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Watergate: The Public Lawyer and The Bar as seen from the 
Perspective of the ABA Ethics Committee, 30 BUS. LAW. 295, 296 (1975). 
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in many instances viewed as infallible and above the law.40  There seems to 
have been a general attitude that began with Nixon that the ends sought by 
the White House justified any means.  For example, with respect to the 
documents Nixon wanted from the Brookings Institute, tapes of Nixon 
reveal demands from him such as, “Goddamnit, get in [the Brookings 
Institute] and get those files. Blow the safe and get it,” and “You’re to 
break into the place, rifle the files, and bring them in.”41  In 1975 Dean 
Weckstein wrote about this attitude among the Watergate actors: 
There is a difference in application, but not in underlying principle, between 
those who would state that it is a lawyer’s duty to use any means (legal or illegal; 
honest or dishonest) to get his client off or otherwise achieve a victory and those 
who would break into a psychiatrist’s office or engage in illegal wiretapping in 
the name of national security or to get their candidate elected and save the world 
from George McGovern.42 
B. Lawyers’ Crimes and Discipline 
The criminal offenses of some of the lawyers involved in Watergate 
included “ordering, acquiescing in, participating in, or helping to cover up 
burglaries and thefts; illegal wiretapping; obstruction of justice; perjury; 
violations of campaign contribution laws; [and] giving and accepting 
bribes.”43  Most of these lawyers were not acting in their capacity as a 
lawyer when they engaged in misconduct.44  This did not, however, prevent 
them from being subject to discipline by the states and courts in which they 
were admitted to practice.45  Nor did that fact prevent damage to the 
reputation of lawyers and their role in the administration of justice.46 
John Dean, former White House Counsel, famously testified before 
the Senate Watergate Committee in 1973 about a list he had made of all the 
people that he thought had violated the law.47  He had put an asterisk next 
to ten of the names on the list, each of whom was a lawyer.48  Senator 
Talmadge questioned Dean about the significance of the marks and Dean 
responded, “[T]hat was just a reaction to myself, the fact that how in God’s 
name could so many lawyers get involved in something like this?”49  
Dean’s list turned out to be modest. 
 
 40 See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 41 DEAN, supra note 27, at 32–33; STANLEY I. KUTLER, ABUSE OF POWER: THE NEW NIXON 
TAPES 3, 6 (1997). 
 42 Donald T. Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261, 270 
(1975). He   also  wrote,   “We  must   encourage   our   law   students   to   accept   the   priority   of   process   over  
results  and  means  over  ends  .  .  .  .”  Id. 
 43 Tondel, supra note 39, at 296. 
 44 See Stuart E. Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the Lawyer Been Diminished?, 79 
COMM. L.J. 73, 74 (1974). 
 45 See Clark, infra note 50. 
 46 See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 42, at 271; Hertzberg, supra note 44, at 74. 
 47 John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 (2000). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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The National Organization of Bar Counsel created a Special 
Committee on the Co-ordination of Watergate Discipline in 1973.50  The 
committee issued its final report in 1976 and reported that disciplinary 
proceedings had been initiated against twenty-nine lawyers in connection 
with Watergate-related matters.51  The report disclosed that seven of the 
lawyers involved had been disbarred (President Nixon among them), public 
disciplinary action had been taken against another eleven other lawyers, 
and as of 1976 no public disciplinary action had been reported against the 
remaining eleven lawyers.52 
While many of the actions of the disciplined lawyers involved 
violations of the law that were more injurious to society as a whole, many 
of the violations of the law also directly infringed on the rights and interests 
of individuals.  For example, in the opinion that disbarred Nixon from the 
New York Bar, the Court’s description of Nixon’s misconduct included 
conduct that directly violated the rights of Dr. Fielding, who had his office 
broken into, and Daniel Ellsberg, whose personal legal defense was 
obstructed: 
Mr. Nixon improperly . . . attempted to obstruct an investigation by the United 
States Department of Justice of an unlawful entry into the offices of Dr. Lewis 
Fielding, a psychiatrist who had treated Daniel Ellsberg; improperly concealed 
and encouraged others to conceal evidence relating to unlawful activities of 
members of his staff and of the Committee to Re-elect the President; and 
improperly engaged in conduct which he knew or should have known would 
interfere with the legal defense of Daniel Ellsberg.53 
Egil “Bud” Krogh, the Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs to the 
President of the United States and later Undersecretary of Transportation, 
was also disbarred.54  Krogh recalled a meeting where President Nixon’s 
Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, and Chief Domestic Advisor, John 
Ehrlichman, told Krogh, “[Y]ou have one client. And that client is Richard 
Nixon.”55  Krogh has since reflected, “The choice of words was deliberate.  
Our client was a person, not the President or the presidency.  And we were 
to serve his wishes as zealously as we could.”56 
As a member of the White House “Plumbers,” Krogh was instructed 
that the President wanted him to investigate the leak of the Pentagon Papers 
with the “utmost zeal,” and to utilize whatever means the government had 
at its disposal to stop leaks of information that the President considered a 
matter of national security.57  This led to Krogh’s involvement in adopting 
 
 50 N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337; see also Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for 
Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 673, 678–79 (2000). 
 51 N.O.B.C. Reports, supra note 1, at 1337. 
 52 Id.; see also Clark, supra note 50, at 678–79. 
 53 In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 178, 179–80 (N.Y. App. 1976). 
 54 In re Krogh, 536 P.2d 578, 589–90 (Wash. 1975). 
 55 Lynne Reaves, Ethics in Action: Two Recall Watergate Lessons, 70 A.B.A. J. 35, 35 (1984). 
 56 Id. 
 57 In re Krogh, 536 P.2d at 579–80. 
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a plan whereby Howard Hunt, another member of the “Plumbers,” would 
break into the office of Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, in an 
effort to steal records that could depict Ellsberg as someone who was 
unreliable and untrustworthy.58 
The Supreme Court of Washington’s opinion that disbarred Krogh 
focused on his guilty plea to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy 
against the rights of citizens), which was a felony.59  The charges against 
Krogh included specific violations of Dr. Fielding’s rights: 
[T]hat while the respondent was an officer and employee of the United States 
Government, [he] . . . unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, 
conspire, confederate and agree with his co-conspirators to injure, oppress, 
threaten and intimidate Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a citizen of the United States, in 
the free exercise and enjoyment of a right and privilege secured to him by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and to conceal such activities.  It 
further charged that the co-conspirators did, without legal process, probable 
cause, search warrant or other lawful authority, enter the offices of Dr. Fielding 
in Los Angeles County, California, with the intent to search for, examine and 
photograph documents and records containing confidential information 
concerning Daniel Ellsberg, and thereby injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate 
Dr. Fielding in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege secured 
to him by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be 
secure in his person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . .  To all of these allegations, the respondent had pleaded guilty.60 
As otherwise stated by the court, Krogh not only flagrantly 
disregarded the laws of the United States, but also the fundamental rights of 
citizens.61 
The court’s opinion indicated that perhaps the environment in which 
Krogh was functioning helped lead him astray: 
[Krogh] indicated that he had been blinded, perhaps, by the power of the 
Presidency or what he conceived to be its power.  A number of men who 
submitted letters attesting to his good character expressed the concern that they 
in the same circumstances might have behaved in much the same manner.62 
 
 58 Id. at 580. 
 59 Id. at 578. 
 60 Id. at 579. The opinion states that Krogh became distressed when he learned that the burglars 
had left evidence of their break-in  “not, it appears, because  of  concern  of  Dr.  Fielding’s  property  but  
rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary might lead to a discovery of the identity 
of  the  perpetrators.”  Id. at 580. 
 61 Id. at 584. 
 62 Id. at 583; see also D.C. Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (order 
suspending former Attorney General of the United States Richard Kleindienst from the practice of law 
for thirty days  and  stating  “that  respondent  is  a  man  of  high  professional  stature,  with  correspondingly  
high  obligations,  who  was   caught  up   in   a   ‘highly   charged  political  atmosphere   .   .   .  when  pressed  by  
political  opponents’.”);;  In   the  Matter  of  Wild,  361  A.2d  182, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (order suspending 
attorney Claude Wild from the practice of law for one year acknowledged that Wild had been pressured 
by the Nixon administration to make illegal campaign contributions on behalf of his employer, Gulf Oil, 
and that he feared reprisals to his employer if he did not make the donation). Sam Dash, the chief 
counsel  to  the  Senate  Watergate  Committee  also  wrote  about  the  tension  between  a  lawyer’s  obligation  
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Krogh seems to have given little thought to the impact of his conduct on 
others at the time of his actions; he was focused on his and his superior’s 
interests.63 
Krogh’s reasoning for pleading guilty to the criminal charges suggests 
a later-developed appreciation of his violations of the rights of third parties.  
Krogh explained: 
I had a chance to sit back and sort of look at where I was. I was under indictment 
in both California and Washington and yet I was a person that was at large, free 
to travel, free to associate with whomever I wished. I could say what I wanted to 
and if I said it to certain individuals it would get reported.  I could attend any 
church of my choice.  There were a number of things I was enjoying as a 
defendant, potential defendant in a criminal trial and yet here I was defending 
conduct when I was a government servant which had stripped another individual 
of his Fourth Amendment rights to be secure from an illegal search, and I 
suppose it was that I felt that if I had continued to defend that, I would in a sense 
be attacking the very rights which I was enjoying at that time as a potential 
defendant.64 
Charles Colson, White House Aide and Special Counsel to President 
Nixon, was also disbarred following his conviction for obstruction of 
justice.65  The charges to which Colson pled guilty included impeding and 
obstructing justice in connection with the criminal trial of Daniel Ellsberg 
by “devising and implementing a scheme to defame and destroy the public 
image and credibility of Daniel Ellsberg and those engaged in the legal 
defense of Daniel Ellsberg, with the intent to influence, obstruct and 
impede the conduct and outcome of the criminal prosecution . . . .”66  These 
activities were done at the behest of President Nixon who was angered by 
the release of the Pentagon Papers and had instructed Colson to stop the 
leaks of sensitive information “no matter what the cost,” including 
disseminating material to the news media that would “expose” Ellsberg and 
his motives.67  There is, of course, a societal interest in the integrity of 
criminal proceedings; but in addition, Daniel Ellsberg and his counsel also 
had an individual interest that was infringed by this conduct—namely the 
 
to  do  the  right   thing  and  a  client’s  expectations  of  a   lawyer.     With respect to teaching legal ethics he 
wrote: 
It’s  nice   to   talk  about  these  things  theoretically   in   law  school.     But   in  the  real  world  the  
choice a lawyer sometimes has to make is to stand up to a client who wants to do 
something wrong and say no.  And by standing up to him you may lose your job. 
Reaves, supra note 55, at 35. 
 63 The opinion disbarring Krogh states that he became distressed when he learned that the 
burglars had left evidence of their break-in “not,   it   appears, because   of   concern   of   Dr.   Fielding’s  
property but rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary might lead to a discovery of 
the  identity  of  the  perpetrators.” In re Krogh, 536 P.2d at 580. 
 64 Id. at 581. 
 65 In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 66 Id. at 1162–63. Some of the specific acts included releasing defamatory allegations about one 
of   Ellsberg’s   attorneys   and   attempting   to   obtain   and   release   derogatory   information   about   Daniel  
Ellsberg, including his psychiatric files. Id. at 1163. 
 67 Id. 
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right to be free from lawyers falsely attacking their public image and 
reputation through illicit means. 
Another actor in Watergate, attorney Donald Segretti, was hired by 
two members of Nixon’s staff, Dwight Chapin and Gordon Strachan, to 
pull pranks on Democratic presidential aspirants in order to cause internal 
divisions and prevent the party from uniting around one candidate.68  In 
short, “[Segretti] repeatedly committed acts of deceit designed to subvert 
the free electoral process.”69  As a result of these activities, Donald Segretti 
was convicted of violating campaign laws.70  He was subsequently 
suspended from the practice of law for two years as a result of those 
convictions.71 
Segretti’s “pranks” certainly subverted society’s interest in an honest 
election process, but his activities also invaded the interests of specific 
individuals.  For example, Segretti wrote and distributed a letter on the 
Citizens for Muskie Committee letterhead, without its consent, which 
falsely accused Senators Humphrey and Jackson (both candidates for the 
Democratic nomination for President) of sexual improprieties.72  Both 
Senators Humphrey and Jackson had the individual right not to have a 
lawyer knowingly publicize false accusations about them.  Segretti also 
wrote another letter on Senator Humphrey’s stationery, without his consent, 
falsely alleging that Representative Shirley Chisholm, also a Democratic 
candidate, had been committed to a mental institution and was still under 
psychiatric care.73  Senator Humphrey had the right not to have his identity 
misappropriated, and Representative Chisholm had the right not to have 
false accusations knowingly made about her mental capacities.  Perhaps 
Segretti recognized this when he testified before the Senate Watergate 
Committee, “To the extent the activities have harmed other persons and the 
political process, I have the deepest regret.”74 
The California Supreme Court not only suspended Segretti from the 
practice of law, it also ordered that he (and all future suspended members 
of the bar) pass the then newly instituted Professional Responsibility 
Examination as a condition of reinstatement.75  The court wrote, “In short, 
 
 68 In re Segretti, 544 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1976). 
 69 Id. at 934. 
 70 Id. at 930. Specifically, Segretti was convicted of violating federal law prohibiting the 
publication or distribution of statements relating to presidential candidates without disclosing the names 
of the persons or organizations responsible for the publication or distribution, as well as conspiracy to 
commit such acts. Id. 
 71 Id. at 936. 
 72 Id. at 931. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 934 n.5. Other disciplinary actions included the disbarment of John Mitchell, former 
Attorney General of the United States, after his conviction for conspiracy, perjury and obstruction of 
justice, In re Mitchell, 351 N.E.2d 743, 744–45 (N.Y. 1976), and the disbarment of Gordon Liddy 
following his conviction for several crimes, including burglary in the second degree. In re Liddy, 343 
N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
 75 In re Segretti, 544 P.2d at 936–37. 
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although we cannot insure that any attorney will in fact behave ethically, 
we can at least be certain that he is fully aware of what his ethical duties 
are.”76 
In the early to mid-1970s, as the events of Watergate were still 
unfolding, some members of the legal profession made comments that 
expressed concern about the Watergate participants’ disregard for the rights 
and dignity of third parties.  For example, in 1973 ABA President Robert 
Meserve spoke to the ABA about Watergate and quoted the late John Lord 
O’Brian who wrote, “The whole American way of life, to say nothing of 
the confidence of the citizens in the government, is based, as we all know, 
upon a belief in the dignity of the individual accompanied by a pervasive 
sense of intelligent toleration and respect for the rights of the others.”77   
Meserve observed that perhaps “the belief in individual dignity and 
the deliberate promotion of mutual respect and tolerance” had suffered the 
most damage from Watergate.78 
Attorney Elliot L. Richardson, who gave an address at the ABA’s 
1974 annual convention, had some similar reflections on the cause of 
Watergate and the continued presence of the cause: 
The problem is that the forces underlying Watergate morality persist.  And very 
important among these forces, although not sufficiently appreciated as such, is 
the decline of a sense of community . . . .  Those who lack a sense of community 
become prone to a rootless kind of amorality that makes them easily influenced 
by the institutional value systems to which they happen for the time being to 
belong.79 
Richardson went on to state that such rootlessness may lead to the 
“sustained pursuit of self-interest,” and that such “[e]xcessive absorption in 
self-interest leads, in turn, to individualism unconstrained by respect for 
other individuals.”80  Richardson further stated, “Indeed, where there is true 
respect for other people—the awareness that each is a unique, sacrosanct 
individual equal in dignity to every other human being—there is awareness 
of obligation which is higher and more sensitive than any requirement of 
the law.”81 
Richardson’s address is somewhat reminiscent of Justice Brandeis’ 
comments in a 1933 speech where he opined that the reason that lawyers do 
not hold a high position with the people is not because of a lack of 
opportunity, but because “[i]nstead of holding a position of independence, 
between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of 
 
 76 Id. at 936. 
 77 Robert W. Meserve, The Legal Profession and Watergate, 59 A.B.A. J. 985, 986 (1973). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Elliot L. Richardson, The Watergate Morality, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 269 (1974–75) (emphasis 
added). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 271. 
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either, able lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become 
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their 
powers for the protection of the people.”82 
II.  POST-WATERGATE LEGAL REFORMS 
At the time of Watergate, the ABA’s 1969 Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility (“Code”) was the national model of ethical 
rules that influenced the codes of conduct adopted by the various states.  
The ABA revisited the Code in 1977, when it formed the Commission on 
the Evaluation of Professional standards, known as the Kutak Commission, 
to recommend changes to the Code.83  The result was the ABA’s adoption 
of the 1983 Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”), which remains the 
predominant guide for the states today.  However, in order to examine the 
evolution of ethical rules and their perception of the role of the lawyer in 
society, it will be helpful to start our review of ethical guidelines in the 
mid-1800s.  The perception of the lawyer’s role has slightly shifted over 
time from one who is a member of the community, charged with 
maintaining independence and keeping an eye on justice, to one who is 
more of a partisan advocate who has less independence from the directives 
of his or her client.84  This shift may underlie part of the cause of 
Watergate, and it still persists today. 
A. Ethics before the ABA’s Involvement 
Before the ABA drafted the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, 
there were several early statements of ethics that influenced the 
development of the ABA’s 1908 Canons.  First, David Hoffman’s 1846 
book A Course of Legal Study contains one of the earliest American 
statements of lawyers’ ethics in a section titled “Fifty Resolutions in regard 
to Professional Development” (“Resolutions”).85  The Resolutions 
contemplated the lawyer’s role as a moral agent of justice as being 
paramount to the lawyer’s role as a zealous advocate under the law.  
Otherwise stated, Hoffman believed that moral law, which he understood to 
have a religious foundation, took priority over positive law.86  For example, 
the Resolutions provided the following with respect to the representation of 
a defendant who the lawyer knows has committed a crime: 
 
 82 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 337 (1933). 
 83 ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v (1987) [hereinafter ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND 
THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES]. 
 84 Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics—II The 
Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 220–22 (2002). 
 85 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE 
PROFESSION GENERALLY 752–75 (1846). Hoffman drafted this book to be the curriculum at his planned 
law school at the University of Maryland. James M. Altman, Considering  the  A.B.A.’s  1908  Canons  of  
Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2422 (2003). 
 86 Altman, supra note 85, at 2423. Hoffman’s   resolutions   included: “What   is   morally   wrong, 
cannot be professionally right . . . .” HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 765. 
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Persons of atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and man, are 
entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure and 
honourable profession; and, indeed, to no intervention beyond securing them a 
fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause, and the due 
application of the law: all that goes beyond this, either in manner or substance, is 
unprofessional, and proceeds, either from a mistaken view of the relation of 
client and counsel, or from some unworthy and selfish motive, which sets a 
higher value on professional display and success, than on truth and justice, and 
the substantial interests of the community.87 
Other Resolutions regarding civil matters contained similar principles.  
For example, the Resolutions admonished a lawyer never to plead the 
statute of limitations if that was the only defense available and the client 
was conscious of owing a debt.88  Similarly, the Resolutions stated that 
lawyers “will never plead, or otherwise avail of the bar of Infancy, against 
an honest demand” if the client has the ability to pay and has no other 
defense.89  They also stated that even if the law provided for such a 
defense, the lawyer should independently judge whether its use was proper 
under the circumstances.90  One writer described Hoffman’s moral 
philosophy as follows, “He maintains that attorneys must independently 
consult their consciences when conducting their cases and should not press 
claims that would make bad law.  Hoffman’s moral system, then, is 
explicitly premised on the assumption that men’s consciences will 
accurately reflect shared community norms.”91 
The next influential statement of lawyers’ ethical duties was George 
Sharswood’s “An Essay on Professional Ethics,” which was published in 
1884 and then reprinted in 1907.92  Sharswood also emphasized the 
importance of a lawyer’s conscience in the course of his professional work, 
but his approach has been described as more nuanced than Hoffman’s.93  
With respect to defendants, Sharswood believed that the value of lawyers 
in the adversary system provided sufficient justification for a lawyer to 
represent a client who the lawyer believed had committed a wrong.94  
However, his view was more akin to Hoffman’s when it came to 
representing a plaintiff in a civil case.  In that situation, Sharswood wrote 
 
 87 HOFFMAN, supra note 85, at 756. 
 88 Id. at 754. 
 89 Id. at 754–55. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession:  The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar 
Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 494 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
 92 GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1993). 
 93 Altman, supra note 85, at 2427–29. 
Because Sharswood emphasizes, much more than Hoffman, the importance of the 
adversary process to the administration of justice and acknowledges, to a much greater 
extent,  that  the  lawyer’s  professional  role  is  shaped  by  that  process,  Sharswood’s  view  of  
the  lawyer’s  duty  ‘when  the  legal demands or interests of his client conflict with his own 
sense  of  what  is  just  and  right’  is  much  more  nuanced  than  Hoffman’s. 
Id. at 2427. 
 94 Id. at 2428–29. 
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that a lawyer has “an undoubted right, and [is] in duty bound, to refuse to 
be concerned for a plaintiff in the pursuit of a demand, which offends his 
sense of what is just and right.”95  Sharswood also wrote that, other than the 
ministry, there was no profession other than the law where a “high-toned 
morality” was imperative; indeed “[h]igh moral principle is [the lawyer’s] 
only safe guide; the only torch to light his way amidst darkness and 
obstruction.”96 
Lastly, the first code of ethics formally adopted in the country was the 
Alabama State Bar Association’s Code (“Alabama Code”), adopted in 
1887.97  The Alabama Code also contemplated that a lawyer’s role as an 
advocate would be subordinate to his own moral views and to his 
obligations to third parties: 
[A]ccording to the Alabama Code, the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation is 
subject to the lawyer’s greater obligations to (i) the legal system, i.e. ‘obedience 
to law’; (ii) third parties; i.e. ‘the obligation to his neighbor’; and (iii) his own 
moral view of right and wrong or, in other words, what was just and unjust in the 
eyes of his God; i.e. ‘accountability to the Creator.’98 
The Alabama Code heavily influenced the ABA’s Canons of 
Professional Ethics, with some provisions of the Canons being derived 
primarily from the language in the Alabama Code.99 
B. The Evolution of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Since its formation, the American Bar Association has adopted three 
major iterations of ethical guidelines for lawyers in the United States—the 
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the 1969 Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Each 
document gives some consideration of the role of morality in lawyering, 
although the emphasis on the lawyer’s role as a moral actor arguably 
decreases with each version.  Each document has also contained language 
regarding the need for lawyers to operate within the bounds of the law in 
order to uphold the public’s respect for the law and the legal profession, 
which are important rationales.  None of these documents, however, 
explicitly state that upholding the rule of law frequently serves another 
broad purpose—it prevents a lawyer from becoming an instrument in the 
violation of the rights of third parties. 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 SHARSWOOD, supra note 92, at 55. Sharswood also wrote,  “The  client  has  no  right  to  require  
[the lawyer] to be illiberal—and he should throw up his brief sooner than do what revolts against his 
own  sense  of  what  is  demanded  by  honor  and  propriety.”   Id. at 74–75. Sharswood also acknowledges 
that there are not necessarily easy answers when the legal demands and interests of the client conflict 
with  the  lawyer’s  own  sense  of  what  is  just  and  right.  Id. at 81. 
 97 Altman, supra note 85, at 2437. 
 98 Id. at 2448 (emphasis added). 
 99 Id. at 2453. 
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While all of the documents contain some sections that give parameters 
about lawyers’ treatment of third parties in certain circumstances, none of 
them specifically set out third parties as an important beneficiary of 
adherence to the rule of law or as a specific consideration that should 
inform a lawyer’s ethical decision-making regarding his or her actions.  
This is not to suggest that a lawyer’s loyalty to his or her client is not going 
to trump consideration of a third party’s rights at times; indeed, sometimes 
the proper role of a lawyer will demand that outcome.  That reality, 
however, should not preclude a lawyer from thinking through the 
implications of his or her conduct regarding the rights of third parties and, 
perhaps through that lens, some misconduct could be averted.  
Furthermore, even when a lawyer concludes that the law properly demands 
action of him or her that will harm the interests of third parties, this 
reflection may allow the lawyer to discuss with the client not just what the 
law allows, but the moral implications of taking a legally permissible 
course of action.  At other times, the lawyer may conclude that the law 
demands action of him or her that will harm the rights of the third parties, 
but these moments may allow for important reflection on whether the law 
as written has struck the right balance between advocacy and interests in 
justice.100  Working to reform and improve the law is also within the proper 
role of all lawyers.101 
C. The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 
In 1908 the ABA promulgated the Canons of Professional Ethics 
(“Canons”).102  The Canons are believed to be, at least in part, a response to 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s criticism of the legal profession, 
particularly corporate lawyers.103  In 1905 President Roosevelt gave a 
speech at Harvard where he made the following statements about the legal 
profession: 
Every man of great wealth who runs his business with cynical contempt for those 
prohibitions of the law which by hired cunning he can escape or evade is a 
menace to our community; and the community is not to be excused if it does not 
develop a spirit which actively frowns on and discountenances him.  The great 
profession of the law should be that profession whose members ought to take the 
lead in the creation of just such a spirit.  We all know that, as things actually are, 
many of the most influential and most highly remunerated members of the bar in 
every centre of wealth make it their special task to work out bold and ingenious 
schemes by which their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade 
 
 100 See infra Part IV.A. 
 101 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 6 (2009) (“As a public citizen, a lawyer should 
seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of 
service rendered by the legal  profession.”). 
 102 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908). 
 103 Altman, supra note 85, at 2403. 
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the laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of great 
wealth.104 
Hoffman’s Resolutions, Sharswood’s essay on ethics, and the 
Alabama State Bar Association’s 1887 Code all had some influence on the 
drafters of the Canons.105  There is also support for the view that, by the 
late 1800s, lawyers were viewing their responsibilities to their clients as 
their primary, and perhaps exclusive, moral obligation and the Canons were 
drafted to try to counter that trend.106  While heavily influenced by the 
Alabama Code, one writer has argued that the Canons “express a more 
robust vision of conscientious lawyering that enlarges the authority of, and 
gives greater support to, the lawyer’s moral autonomy in the 
relationship.”107  The Canons “prescribed a vision of conscientious 
lawyering” where “a special obligation for achieving moral and legal 
justice” limited zealous advocacy.108 
The Preamble to the Canons underscored the need for the public’s 
faith in the legal profession: “The future of the Republic, to a great extent, 
depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied.  It cannot be 
so 85 maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our 
profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.”109  Believing 
that no set of rules could be codified to govern the behavior of lawyers, the 
Canons adopted broad ethical principles to provide general guidelines.110 
The Canons contained principles that cautioned lawyers to limit their 
zealous advocacy by adherence to the rule of law.  For example, the 
Canons expressly stated that the rule of law constrained a lawyer’s 
obligation to zealously advocate for his client and recognized the damage 
to the profession’s reputation when the public viewed lawyers as not being 
bound by the law: 
Nothing operates more certainly to create or foster popular prejudice against 
lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public 
esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than 
does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable 
transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to 
succeed in winning his client’s cause . . . .  The office of attorney does not permit, 
 
 104 President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at Harvard University (June 28, 1905), available at 
http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches/143.txt. One scholar has suggested 
that  the  ABA’s  formation  of  the  1908  Code  of  Professional  Ethics  stemmed  from  this  speech.  Altman, 
supra note 85, at 2409. 
 105 Altman, supra note 85, at 2400; see also David O. Burbank & Robert S. Duboff, Were the 
Watergate Lawyers an Exception?, 3 B. LEADER 17, 17 (1978). 
 106 Altman, supra note 85, at 2447. 
 107 Id. at 2441. 
 108 Id. at 2401. 
 109 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Preamble (1908), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/Canons_Ethics.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 110 Id. 
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much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of 
fraud or chicane.  He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.111 
Canons 32 further advised that the lawyer  
advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when he 
renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his 
undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law.  He must 
also observe and advise his client to observe the statute law . . . .112 
This drafting appears to place primary consideration on moral law and 
secondary consideration on positive law.  It may also have been the 
drafter’s most direct response to President Roosevelt’s concerns.113  Many 
of the drafters shared his concerns about the increased commercialization 
of the legal profession “as a general threat to the moral autonomy of the 
lawyer in the attorney-client relationship.”114 
The Canons did recognize that in performing his duties, the lawyer’s 
treatment of third parties had some specific limits.  For example, the 
Canons made clear that clients, not lawyers, are the litigants and that 
clients’ animosity towards each other should not influence a lawyer’s 
treatment of opposing counsel or parties.115  Canon 18 stated,  
A lawyer should always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due 
consideration . . . .  The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer’s 
conscience in professional matters.  He has no right to demand that his counsel 
shall abuse the opposite party or indulge in offensive personalities.116 
Similarly, Canon 30 admonished a lawyer to “decline to conduct a 
civil cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely 
to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.”117 
The Canons also acknowledged one particular circumstance where the 
rights of third parties would trump a lawyer’s fidelity to his or her client.  
Canon 37 provided that “The announced intention of a client to commit a 
crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect.  
He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the 
act or protect those against whom it is threatened,” although he is not 
 
 111 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (emphasis added). In this same spirit, the Canons 
also stated that no client was entitled  to  receive  “any  service  or  advice  involving  disloyalty to the law . . 
.  .”  CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908). 
 112 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908) (emphasis added). 
 113 Altman, supra note 85, at 2461. 
 114 Id. at 2475. Altman’s   article   concludes,   “[T]o lawyers in the twenty-first century, for whom 
norms  of   lawyer  conduct  have  become  ‘legalized,’   [the  Canons]  may  seem  overly  ambitious.     But   to  
members of the Canons Committee, a normative statement regarding lawyer conduct implied something 
imbued  with  morality  and,  in  at  least  some  members’  minds,  religion  as  well.”  Id. at 2499. 
 115 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon   17   (1908)   (“Whatever   may   be   the   ill-feeling existing 
between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward 
each other or toward suitors in the cause.  All personalities between lawyers should be scrupulously 
avoided.”). 
 116 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 18 (1908). 
 117 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 30 (1908). 
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compelled to do so.118  Implicit in this Canon is an acknowledgment that 
there are times when the rights of a third party may trump a lawyer’s duty 
to his or her client. 
While the Canons articulated specific limits on advocacy that take into 
consideration the rights of third parties, the Canons did not explicitly set 
out the rights of third parties as an important corollary to respect for the 
rule of law or as an important broad framework through which a lawyer 
should consider the consequences of his or her actions when acting on 
behalf of a client.  In fact, the drafters of the Canons rejected a proposal to 
include language similar to that found in the Alabama Code regarding 
“limitations upon a lawyer’s zealous representation of his client in terms of 
‘man’s accountability to his Creator, . . . the duty of obedience to law and 
the obligation to his neighbor.”119 
C. The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
In 1969 the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (“Code”), which supplanted the Canons.120  The structure of 
the Code differed from the Canons.  Whereas the Canons consisted of only 
ethical guidelines, the Code articulated nine general Canons each of which 
was followed by ethical considerations and specific disciplinary rules.121  
The Code explained that the Canons were statements of axiomatic norms, 
the Ethical Considerations were aspirational in character, and the 
Disciplinary Rules were mandatory in nature and were to form the 
standards for disciplinary action as enforced by the various states.122  Like 
the Canons, the Code contained principles regarding the rule of law’s limits 
on a lawyer’s zealous advocacy, as well as some specific principles 
regarding lawyers’ respect for the rights of third parties. 
The Preamble to the Code starts with some recognition of the 
relationship between the rule of law and the rights of individuals, although 
it does not specifically put these ideas in the context of a lawyer’s conduct: 
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon 
recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in 
respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for 
enlightened self-government.  Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only 
 
 118 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908). 
 119 Altman, supra note 85, at 2453 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 120 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). The Code was amended in 1970 and 
every year between 1974–1980.  A copy of the Code with its amendments is available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/ 
mcpr.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 121 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980). The Preface to the 
Code described some of the  deficiencies  with  the  Canons  as  follows,  “The  previous  Canons  were  not  an  
effective teaching instrument and failed to give guidance to young lawyers beyond the language of the 
Canons themselves . . . . They were not cast in language designed for disciplinary enforcement and 
many  abounded  with  quaint  expressions  of  the  past.”  Id. at Preface. 
 122 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980); see also Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991). 
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through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection.  
Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for 
law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.123 
The need for lawyers to respect the rule of law is also found 
throughout the Code.  For example, Ethical Consideration 1-5 states, 
“Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a 
lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession.  
Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law.  To lawyers especially, 
respect for the law should be more than a platitude.”124  Respect for the rule 
of law is also the central theme in Canon 7 of the Code, “A Lawyer Should 
Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.”125  Similarly, 
Ethical Consideration 7-19 states, “The duty of a lawyer to his client and 
his duty to the legal system are the same; to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of the law.”126 
The Code also permits a lawyer, as did the Canons, to inform a client 
about the moral consequences of a course of action, although this 
consideration is not expressed with the same primacy as it was in the 
Canons.127  Instead, the Code provides: 
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal 
considerations . . . .  In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often 
desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision 
that is morally just as well as legally permissible.  He may emphasize the 
possibility of harsh consequences that might result from assertion of legally 
permissible positions. In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always 
remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or 
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for 
himself.128   
Although, as one writer concluded, “In the last analysis, the Code is 
not a guide to moral action.  The Code, with its emphasis on the rules, 
presents as the ultimate question to be answered, ‘How do I stay out of 
trouble?’ rather than ‘How do I make the moral choice?’”129 
Like the Canons, the Code does not contain any broad statement that 
advocacy should be constrained by the interests of third parties, but it did 
include specific provisions that related to a lawyer’s obligation to respect 
the rights of third parties in some instances.  For example, Ethical 
Consideration 2-30 warns lawyers not to accept employment when “the 
 
 123 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (emphasis added). 
 124 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1980). 
 125 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). 
 126 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980). 
 127 See CANONS, supra note 109. 
 128 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (emphasis added). 
 129 Thomas G. Bost, The Lawyer as Truth-Teller: Lessons from Enron, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 505, 514 
(2004); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 79   (1994)   (describing   the   “amazing   shrinking  
concept of the lawyer as  an  independent  counselor”). 
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person seeking to employ him desires to institute or maintain an action 
merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another.”130  
Also, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 permitted, but like the Canons did not 
require, a lawyer to reveal “[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime 
and the information necessary to prevent the crime,” which would in many 
instances impact the rights of third parties.131  The ethical considerations in 
the Code further provided: 
In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for his 
determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a 
manner consistent with the best interests of his client.  However, when an action 
in the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client 
for permission to forego such action.132 
One can infer that at times an action may be unjust because of its 
impact on third parties, although the Code did not explicitly state this. 
D. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
While the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”) were 
not adopted until 1983133—over a decade after Watergate—the events of 
Watergate were in many ways responsible for spurring the legal profession 
to revisit the Code of Professional Responsibility.134  A group of lawyers 
headed by Robert Kutak, known as the Kutak Commission, worked for six 
years to draft the Model Rules.135  Watergate also prompted the ABA to 
adopt a law school accreditation requirement that compels accredited law 
schools to provide students with legal ethics instruction.136 
The structure of the Rules differed from the Code.  The Code 
contained canons, ethical considerations and disciplinary rules.137  The 
Rules, however, abandoned this tripartite structure for a structure that 
contained black letter rules followed by explanatory comments for each 
rule.138  Preceding the black letter rules is a Preamble that sets out broad 
 
 130 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-30 (1980); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109 (1980); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980). 
 131 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1980); compare with CANONS OF 
PROF’L ETHICS Canon 37 (1908). 
 132 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1980). 
 133 While the Rules were first adopted in 1983 they have been amended numerous times. MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009). 
 134 See, e.g., Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 67–68 (discussing the impact of Watergate on reforms in 
the legal profession); Robert W. Meserve, Action 1972–73—American Bar Association, 59 A.B.A. J. 
986, 990 (1973) (“[T]he involvement of prominent lawyers in the Watergate affair has heightened 
professional  concerns  about  discipline.”). 
 135 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 68. 
 136 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Teaching Legal Ethics a Quarter of a Century After Watergate, 
51 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 661 (2000); Clark, supra note 50, at 673. The Committee that drafted  the  ABA’s  
1908 Canons of Ethics had actually recommended in its 1907 report that ethics be taught in all law 
schools and that applicants to the bar be examined on that topic. Altman, supra note 85, at 2420–21. 
 137 See Preface, supra, note 120.  
 138 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 
83, at 3–4 (discussing the change in the format and the rationale for the change). 
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guidelines regarding the lawyer’s role and responsibilities.  To the extent 
that the Rules set out aspirational principles as found in the ethical 
considerations of the Code, those principles are found in the Preamble and 
in the comments to the Rules.139  A predominate goal of the Rules, 
however, was to legalize the regulation of the legal profession by adopting 
enforceable rules and moving away from ethical standards that contained 
unenforceable aspirations.140 
While the structure differed, the Rules, like the Canons and the Code, 
continued to emphasize the lawyer’s respect for and adherence to the rule 
of law.  The Preamble to the Rules states “[a] lawyer’s conduct should 
conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to 
clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs . . . .  A lawyer 
should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve 
it . . . .”141 
The Rules acknowledge that at times a lawyer’s job will create 
conflicts “between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system 
and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while 
earning a satisfactory living.”142  While “remaining an ethical person” may 
be read to encompass a concern about the rights of third parties, the Rules 
do not explicitly articulate that consideration as part of the web of conflicts 
which a lawyer must sometimes confront.143  This section states that 
sometimes the Rules will provide a direct answer to the conflict, but 
sometimes they will not, and the lawyer must be guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules.144  The Rules further state that “[t]hese 
principles include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a 
client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while 
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons 
involved in the legal system.”145  While third parties certainly have an 
interest in courteous and civil treatment, a clear principle affirming respect 
for the rights of third parties would include a broader articulation of their 
interests. 
 
 139 Id. at   10   (“Professor   Geoffrey   C.   Hazard,   Jr.,   Reporter   of   the   Commission,   noted   that   the  
Preamble   was   intended   to   set   forth   balanced   and   realistic   statements   about   a   lawyer’s role and 
responsibilities.”)  Such aspirational principles can also be found in some of the comments to the rules, 
which   at   times   discuss   what   a   lawyer   “should”   do.   Id. at 15. See also David Luban & Michael 
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 56–57 (1995) 
(finding ethical aspirations in some of the permissive rules). 
 140 See William H. Simon, Conceptions of Legality, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 670–71 (2000); Luban 
& Millemann, supra note 139, at 46–51; Hazard, supra note 122, at 1241–42, 1253–55. 
 141 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 5 (2009). 
 142 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 9 (2009). 
 143 Id.   
 144 Id. 
 145 Id.  Respect for the rule of law is also embodied in other provisions of the Rules that are 
analogous to provisions in the Canons and the Code.  For example, Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from 
counseling a client to engage, or assisting a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. Id. at R. 
1.2(d). 
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Like the Code, the Rules continue to contemplate that a lawyer’s 
advice may include moral factors, although the moral independence of the 
attorney is not stressed as it was in the Canons.146  Rule 2.1 states that: “In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer 
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social 
and political factors, which may be relevant to the client’s situation.”147  
The comments to Rule 2.1 suggest that moral factors could include the 
impact on third parties: 
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially 
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are 
predominant.  Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be 
inadequate.  It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical 
considerations in giving advice.  Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as 
such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and 
may decisively influence how the law will be applied.148 
Other provisions of the Rules also have an underlying concern for 
some rights of third parties.  For example, Rule 3.4 prohibits a variety of 
activities that are deemed to be unfair to opposing parties and their counsel, 
such as unlawfully obstructing their access to evidence or falsifying 
evidence.149 Rule 3.8 compels prosecutors to ensure that the accused have 
been advised of their right to obtain counsel and to be given the opportunity 
to do so.150  Also, Rule 4.1 prohibits lawyers from making a false statement 
of material fact to any third parties during the course of their representation 
of clients.151 
Significant changes in the Model Rules that resulted from Watergate 
included the confidentiality rules in Rule 1.6, which are implicitly driven 
by concern for the rights of third parties.152  Rule 1.6 defined a lawyer’s 
duty of confidentiality more broadly than did the Code.153  As the Kutak 
Commission originally proposed, however, Rule 1.6 permitted a lawyer to 
 
 146 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009). 
 147 Id. 
 148 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Russell 
Pearce, How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And the Answer is not Pro Bono), 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211,   216   (proposing   a   new   Model   Rule   that   would   restore   lawyers’   morally  
accountability); Kevin H. Michels, Lawyer Independence: From Ideal to Viable Legal Standard, 61 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 85, 126–30 (2010) (arguing that Rule 2.1 has been fairly dormant and that states 
should make its practical application more robust). 
 149 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2009). 
 150 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2009). 
 151 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2009). 
 152 See, e.g., Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 68. Model  Rule  1.13,  which  addressed  a  lawyer’s  duties 
when representing an organization, was another significant development post-Watergate. Id. The initial 
version of Rule 1.13 the ABA adopted was disappointing to many critics of the legal profession who 
had hoped for more radical reform after Watergate. Id. at 70. After Enron, those rules were revisited and 
amended again. Id. at 85. 
 153 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES supra note 
83, at 48; see also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 71. 
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reveal a client’s confidences in several situations that would benefit third 
parties, including 
to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another; [and] to rectify 
the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in furtherance of which 
the lawyer’s services had been used.154 
These exceptions in initial drafts, however, immediately became a 
subject of debate and amendment.  “The debate focused on the problem of 
balancing the sometimes conflicting interests of lawyer, client and the 
public.”155 Proponents argued that the proposed rule struck the right 
balance between a client’s right to have confidences protected and the 
public’s right to be protected from criminal acts.156  Opponents, however, 
argued successfully that the exceptions were too broad and inhibited 
lawyer-client communication.157  Thus, Rule 1.6, as adopted, contained 
limited exceptions that permitted a lawyer to reveal confidential 
information “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm.”158 This was a narrower exception than the one in the Code, which 
permitted a lawyer to reveal the “intention of his client to commit a crime 
and the information necessary to prevent the crime.”159 
Rule 1.6, as adopted in 1983, was a disappointment to many lawyers 
who had hoped for more radical reform after Watergate.160  The majority of 
states declined to adopt the rule as adopted by the House of Delegates.161  
There were two subsequent efforts to amend Rule 1.6 to contain provisions 
similar to those proposed by the Kutak Commission, but both of them 
failed.162  It was not until 2003 that Rule 1.6 was amended to allow a 
lawyer to reveal confidences in situations originally contemplated by the 
 
 154 ABA, THE MODEL RULES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES supra note 
83, at 48. There was also an exception when a lawyer needed to disclose confidences to establish a 
claim or defense in a controversy arising out of the legal representation. Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 48–49. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 51. There also remained an exception when a lawyer needed to disclose confidences to 
establish a claim or defense in a controversy arising out of the legal representation. Id. See id. at 51 for 
a red-lined version of the proposed rule as amended. 
 159 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(C)(3) (1969); see also Rochvarg, supra 
note 4, at 71–72.   The   ABA   also   rejected   the   Code’s prior rule that required a lawyer to disclose a 
client’s  fraud  to  try  to  rectify  that  fraud  and,  instead,  prohibited  such  disclosures.  Id.  
 160 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 70. 
 161 Id. at 73. 
 162 ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982–2005, at 115, 117 (2006) [hereinafter ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
Unsuccessful efforts to amend Model Rule 1.6 were first made in 1991. Id. at 115. Another round of 
unsuccessful efforts occurred in 2001. Id. at 117–32. See also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 73. 
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Kutak Commission.163  Since that amendment, Rule 1.6 now provides, in 
part: 
b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the 
lawyer’s services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests 
or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted 
from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which 
the client has used the lawyer’s services.164 
It is not a coincidence that these amendments finally occurred in the 
wake of Enron, a financial scandal that also impacted the reputation of the 
legal profession.165 
III.  THE LEGAL PROFESSION POST-WATERGATE 
Many lawyers have correctly pointed out that the Code, which was the 
national model for a code of ethics at the time of Watergate, left no 
ambiguity about the impropriety of acts such as breaking, entering, perjury 
and obstruction of justice.166  Many lawyers, however, were involved in 
these activities despite clear ethical guidance not to break the law.167  In 
1973, ABA President Robert W. Meserve wrote the following about 
Watergate: 
This is much more than an ethical problem.  No one needs a course in ethics to 
know that burglary or perjury is illegal or immoral.  What is needed is an 
acceptance of a reasonable respect for law and a recognition that no one—
however high or low his rank—is above it.168 
 
 163  ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 133–41. 
 164 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009). This amendment to Model Rule 1.6 was 
adopted   at   the  ABA’s  Annual  Meeting   in   2003.  ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 
133–34.   
 165 See Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 85–86. 
 166 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 9, 34–35   (2002)   (“Most  observers   found   it   ludicrous   to   suppose   that   the  massive  misconduct  
among Nixon appointees and campaign contributors stemmed from their lack of familiarity with bar 
codes  of  conduct.”);;   Interview  with  Chesterfield  Smith,  President,  ABA,  in  S.F.,  Cal.   (Feb.  25,  1974)  
The Bar and Watergate: Conversation with Chesterfield Smith, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 31, 34 (1974) 
[hereinafter Interview] (disregarding suggestions that the Code needed to be revised in response to 
Watergate   because   “[b]reaking   and   entering,   lying,   obstructing   justice,   or   perjuring   oneself   is   a  
violation  under  any  standard  I’ve  ever  heard  of”);;  Robert  W.  Meserve,  Our Profession & Watergate, 2 
STUDENT LAW. 9, 11, 60 (1973–74)   (“Surely,   it   does   not   require   a   close   reading   of   the   Code   of  
Professional Responsibility to support the proposition that breaking and entering is wrong, that perjury 
is  wrong,  or  that  bribery  is  wrong.”).   
 167 See supra Part I. 
 168 Robert W. Meserve, Watergate: Lessons and Challenges for the Legal Profession, 59 A.B.A. J. 
681, 681 (1973). 
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Thus, many lawyers suggested that revising the Code would not 
prevent future situations like Watergate.169  Indeed, since the adoption of 
the Model Rules, there have been subsequent events involving lawyers that 
have once again damaged the reputation of the legal profession to varying 
degrees.170 
A small number of lawyers engaging in misconduct are inevitable.171  
As Chesterfield Smith, the President of the ABA in 1974 said, “I would 
hope that someday [lawyers] could get to be lily-white, but realistically I 
don’t believe that’s possible.”172  Humans are not infallible and a minority 
of lawyers will always fall from grace regardless of the cultural and legal 
limits society imposes.  Furthermore, attorney discipline, civil lawsuits and 
criminal lawsuits give society tools to hold such wrongdoers accountable 
for their actions, and to send a deterrent message to others.  The legal 
profession should, however, continue to examine whether it can further 
improve itself through the rules it has adopted and the culture that it creates 
within the profession.173  Even though it is a small number of lawyers who 
engage in conduct that diminishes the reputation of the legal profession, 
that small number has a profound impact on the public’s perception of the 
profession.174  Any reduction in that small number should be of significant 
benefit to the public and the legal profession. 
If the law plainly prohibited the conduct of many of the actors in 
Watergate, then what motivated their decisions?  The conduct of the actors 
involved in Watergate has, in many instances, been explained by the 
context in which the actors were placed—government offices—and 
specifically the White House, with all of its power and prestige.175  There is 
undoubtedly some truth to that, but the motivation to please a powerful 
client can arise in many other contexts than the White House.  In today’s 
competitive business world, private attorneys must fight to retain the 
business of their clients or risk losing income and frequently jobs.176  This 
 
 169 See supra text accompanying note 166. 
 170 See infra text accompanying note 179. 
 171 Rotunda, supra note 136, at 661, 663–65 (listing some malpractice claims based on ethical 
violations). 
 172 See Interview, supra note 166, at 31. 
 173 See Marianne M. Jennings, The Disconnect Between and Among Legal Ethics, Business Ethics, 
Law, and Virtue: Learning Not to Make Ethics so Complex, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 995, 997–98 (2004) 
(arguing   that   at   the   point   that   a   client’s   fraud   begins   “the   codified   ethical   standards   and   legal  
prohibitions are inapplicable.  Virtue  is  required  and  courage  of  convictions  demanded.”). 
 174 See Sandra   Day   O’Connor, Foreword to RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: 
LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS vii   (2008)   (“It   takes  only   a   few  betrayals,  
however, to seriously damage the reputation of lawyers, both individual and collective.  If the legal 
profession  is  to  prevent  breaches  of  trust,  it  needs  to  understand  how  and  why  they  occur.”). 
 175 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 79,  at  268  (“To  a  staff associate, even a highly placed one, the 
prestige of the Presidential office can be awe-inspiring.  In this context, it takes heroic effort for the 
subordinate  to  recognize  that  a  President’s  whims  are  not  necessarily  made  of  cast  iron.”). 
 176 See ABEL, supra note 174, at 58–59  (“[M]any   lawyers  feel  pressure  from  clients   to  facilitate  
illegal activity.  And 38 percent  of  Americans  believe  that  ‘most  lawyers  would  engage  in  unethical  or  
illegal activities to help a client in an  important  case.’”)  (footnotes  omitted);;  Rhode  &  Paton,  supra note 
166,   at   26   (“The   challenges   of  maintaining   independent   judgment   are   compounded   in   a   competitive  
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can create incredible pressure to satisfy the demands of clients who are not 
bound by our professional rules of ethics or frequently even interested in 
hearing about them.  There continues to be a danger that lawyers’ self-
interests create pressure to serve the demands of powerful clients and that 
this can at times compromise their judgment and ethics.177  The Carnegie 
Foundation noted this danger in its 2007 report on legal education: “In 
many professional settings [the] lofty ideals of public spirit and service to 
clients can seem far removed from reality.  The press of business 
demands . . . frequently focuses thoughts elsewhere than on the public 
purposes of the profession.”178 
A brief overview of a couple of more recent stories involving lawyers 
will follow to explore, albeit briefly and anecdotally, other contexts where 
the lawyers’ self-interest in serving clients lead to problematic conduct.  
Such conduct frequently has an adverse effect on third parties and, 
concomitantly, on the legal profession. 
One of the more notorious recent events was the collapse of Enron.179  
While no lawyers were subject to any criminal charges or disciplinary 
action as a result of Enron,180 many people raised questions about the role 
lawyers played in its demise.181  Enron’s failure had a grave impact on the 
interests of third parties as “more than 4000 employees lost their jobs [and] 
thousands of investors also lost their life savings, as ‘$70 billon in wealth 
vanished.’”182  Enron’s collapse mainly involved corporate officials, 
accountants and bankers, but lawyers were in the picture, too.183  Enron had 
in-house and outside counsel, both of whom were advising it on the 
structuring of financial transactions and financial disclosure 
requirements.184  Enron’s accounting firm, Andersen, also had in-house 
 
market where powerful clients can shop for expedient rather than  for  ethical  advice.”). 
 177 Jerold S. Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1287, 1288 
(1976)  (arguing  that  “Watergate  demonstrated  the  attitude,  all  too  prevalent  in  the  modern  history  of  the  
legal profession, that law should serve power”);;   see also Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1322–25 (2006) (discussing the impact of self-interest and group-thinking on 
ethical reasoning); Susan D. Carle, Power   as   a   Factor   in   the   Lawyers’   Ethical   Deliberation, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 118–20 (2006) (arguing for a model of ethical decision-making that considers 
the  power  of  one’s  client  in  light  of  other  interests  at  stake  in  litigation). 
 178 CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 126–27 (2007). 
 179 For an overview of the key facts relating to the collapse of Enron, see Rhode & Paton, supra 
note 166, at 13–17. 
 180 See Lawrence J. Fox, Can Confidentiality Survive Enron, Arthur Anderson, and the ABA?, 34 
STETSON L. REV.  147,  152  (2004)  (“Nobody  had  found  that  there  was  a  single  lawyer  who  was  aware  of  
things  that  should  have  been  reported  up  the  corporate  ladder  and  had  failed  to  do  so.”). 
 181 See, e.g., Richard Acello, Enron Lawyers in the Hot Seat: Bankruptcy Examination Outlines 
Possible Causes of Action, 90 A.B.A. J. 22, 22–24 (2004); Bernard S. Carrey, Enron—Where Were the 
Lawyers?, 27 VT. L. REV. 871, 871–72 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass?, 
Forbes.com (Aug. 12, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/ 
2002/0812/058_print.html.  
 182 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 9–10; see also Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 74. 
 183 Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 74–75. 
 184 Rhode & Paton, supra note 166, at 17, 19. 
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counsel who became the center of a controversy regarding the timing of 
Andersen’s destruction of documents.185 
Some legal commentators have argued that the lawyers should have 
disclosed their client’s misconduct to the Securities & Exchange 
Commission.186  Many have viewed this event through the lens of an 
attorney’s obligations when representing an organization, as well as an 
attorney’s duty of confidentiality.187  Others have viewed the events 
through the lens of conflicts of interest.188  For example, Enron’s outside 
counsel relied on Enron’s business for more than seven percent of its 
revenues—Enron was the firm’s largest client.189  “Over the years V&E 
[Vinson & Elkins, Enron’s outside counsel] had represented Enron in a 
wide range of matters, with Enron paying the firm legal fees of over $162 
million in the five years ending with 2001.”190  The desire to keep that 
client satisfied must have been tremendous.  
These are certainly valid perspectives from which to view the Enron 
scandal.  But it is also worth thinking about whether the lawyers 
sufficiently considered the impact of their client’s conduct on third parties 
when they were advising their clients.  Did they consider the impact on all 
of the retirees who would be left with no income because of their client’s 
fraud?  Did they consider all of the jobs that would be lost when Enron 
collapsed?  Certainly the interests of third parties may be legitimately 
injured during the course of economic competition and events such as 
mergers, downsizing, etc.  But when the rights of third parties are injured 
because of fraud, the need for the lawyer to consider third parties’ interests 
becomes particularly heightened.  “As many legal ethics experts note, in 
cases of client misconduct, lawyers’ professional norms of client loyalty 
often conflict with personal norms of honesty and integrity.  To reduce the 
cognitive dissonance, lawyers will often unconsciously dismiss or discount 
evidence of misconduct and its impact on third parties.”191 
The federal government’s response to Enron—Sarbanes Oxley—
embodies the idea that “every attorney owes an obligation to the public 
separate from an attorney’s obligation to his client.”192  This position 
received strong opposition from the legal profession.193  The legal 
profession, however, has been more accepting of the lawyer’s obligation to 
the public when the lawyer is a prosecutor.  Model Rule 3.8 articulates 
special duties for prosecutors, and the comments to that Rule explain that 
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“[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate.”194 
The case that came to be known as the Duke Lacrosse rape case is a 
recent notorious example of a prosecutor who did not act as a minister of 
justice.  Prosecutor Michael Nifong was the district attorney for Durham 
County, North Carolina when he filed rape charges against three lacrosse 
players at Duke University—all of whom were eventually declared 
innocent.195  Nifong’s overzealous prosecution of the case appears to have 
been motivated by a desire to please his “client,” i.e. the people of Durham 
County who were soon going to choose whether or not to reelect him.196  
The Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar 
found that prosecutor Nifong violated many rules in the Duke Lacrosse 
rape case, including Rule 3.8.197  The Chairman of the Disciplinary Hearing 
Commission made several comments about Nifong’s apparent motivation 
for his conduct: 
[W]hat we have here, it seems, is that we had a prosecutor who was faced with a 
very unusual situation in which the confluence of his self-interest collided with a 
very volatile mix of race, sex and class . . . .  But we can make no other 
conclusion that those initial statements that he made were to forward his political 
ambitions . . . .  It’s an illustration of the fact that character—good character—is 
not a constant.  Character is dependent upon the situation. Probably any one of us 
could be faced with a situation at some point that would test our good character 
and we would prove wanting.  And that has happened for Mike Nifong.198 
The Chairman also specifically discussed the victims of Nifong’s 
misconduct, who were “the three young men to start with, their families, 
the entire lacrosse team and their coach, Duke University, the justice 
system in North Carolina and elsewhere.”199  The subsequent order that 
disbarred Nifong also discussed how his conduct harmed third parties:  
Nifong’s misconduct resulted in significant actual harm to Reade Seligman, 
Collin Finnerty, and David Evans and their families . . . .  As a result of Nifong’s 
misconduct, these young men experienced heightened public scorn and loss of 
privacy while facing very serious criminal charges of which the Attorney 
General of North Carolina ultimately concluded they were innocent.200 
Watergate and the two examples discussed above do not suggest that 
the lawyers acted with a desire or motivation to harm the interests of third 
 
 194 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009). 
 195 N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35, Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of Discipline, at 2 (July 24, 2007) [hereinafter Nifong Order], available at 
http://www.ncbar.gov/Nifong%20Final%20Order.pdf. 
 196 Id. See also Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False 
Identifications:  A  Fundamental  Failure  to  “Do  Justice”,  76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1354–57 (2007). 
 197 Nifong Order, supra note 195, at 20–21. 
 198 Comments of Disciplinary Panel's Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/us/17duke-text.html?pagewanted=all. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Nifong Order, supra note 195, at 23. 
Do Not Delete 8/1/2012 8:28 PM 
2012] Post-Watergate 127 
parties.  Their motives differed in each situation, although to some extent 
they were all pursing their self-interests by serving the real or perceived 
demands of their clients.  The outcome of their conduct in each situation 
was similar—they all adversely impacted the interests of third parties and, 
concomitantly, the reputation of the legal profession.  Perhaps encouraging 
lawyers to view their decision-making process through the lens of the 
impact on third parties, at least in part, could help improve lawyer decision-
making and judgment.   
IV.  PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE MODEL RULES AND  
LEGAL EDUCATION 
A. Reforms to the Model Rules 
Reforms to the Model Rules alone are unlikely to change the culture of 
the legal profession, but they can be an important component.201  As this 
article has suggested, the Rules should inculcate in lawyers not just a 
respect for the rule of law, which is paramount to a government based on 
laws, but a more humanistic respect for the interests of third parties.  
Viewing conduct through this lens could provide three possible benefits.  
First, it could give a lawyer a perspective to view his or her conduct that 
could deter misconduct.  Second, even if the conduct that will harm the 
interests of a third party is permissible, thinking about these implications 
may give lawyers a more tangible perspective to consider when they are 
advising their clients about the “right thing to do.”  Third, again, even if the 
conduct that will harm the interests of a third party is permissible, thinking 
about such implications may cause lawyers to reflect on whether the 
current rules have struck the right balance between the interests of clients 
and the interests of third parties, or whether legal reform is appropriate.202 
Scholars have written about the increase in lawyer regulation and the 
decrease in the demoralization of legal ethics over time.203  Whether or not 
a lawyer should be a moral advisor and/or independent moral actor has 
been a topic of debate in legal scholarship.204  Even if one did agree that a 
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lawyer should be a moral advisor, in today’s world of moral plurality, there 
may not be agreed upon norms explaining what it means to be “moral,” 
which could meaningfully guide the actions of lawyers.  “Morality” in 
early codes was strongly tied to Christianity, which is not of much 
assistance in today’s world of religious diversity in lawyers’ personal lives 
and secularism in the law.  Thus, returning to broad notions of the lawyer 
as an autonomous moral actor may not provide much meaningful guidance.  
Instead of focusing on “morality,” as a guiding principle for lawyers, it 
may be more helpful if the Model Rules articulated more specific principles 
that elaborate on what it means to be a “moral” advisor or actor. 
The Model Rules specifically guide lawyers to assess their conduct in 
light of compliance with the rule of law, compliance with their duties to 
their clients, and compliance with their duties to the administration of 
justice as an officer of the court.205  The Model Rules, however, are fairly 
scant in their focus on assessing the impact of a lawyer’s conduct on third 
parties.206  Thus, it may be beneficial if the Model Rules specifically 
advised a lawyer to consider the effects of his or her conduct on the rights 
of third parties as part of their ethical decision-making framework.  “When 
the lawyer fully understands the nature of his office, he will then discern 
what restraints are necessary to keep that office wholesome and 
effective.”207 
The Model Rules and its predecessor, the Code, have served two main 
functions.  One is to set out specific standards that can be enforced in 
disciplinary proceedings.  The other is to set out the values and the moral or 
philosophical framework from which lawyers should approach ethical 
decisions.208  In this regard, perhaps the ABA’s decision to eliminate the 
Canons’ aspirational ethical considerations from the Model Rules was a 
loss.  The Model Rules focused on setting out the black letter law regarding 
the conduct of lawyers in greater detail, but perhaps at the expense of the 
more nuanced and complex considerations of the role of the lawyer that 
were in the ethical considerations of the Code.  Professor William H. 
Simon critiqued the Model Rules as follows: 
The way we now tend to teach our students legal ethics in the courses that have 
been mandated in the wake of Watergate tends to emphasize relatively 
mechanical, unreflective rule-following at the expense of relatively complex 
contextual judgment . . . .  The Model Rules were explicitly drafted for the 
purpose of creating black letter rules (that is the term that the drafters used) that 
obviate complex judgment.  The predecessor code of the ABA actually had a 
series of norms that were designed to inspire complex judgment—the so-called 
 
 205 Supra Part III. 
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‘ethical considerations’—aspirational norms that were eliminated by the Model 
Rules precisely to reduce legal ethics to a matter of black letter rule following.209 
The idea of inculcating concerns for the interests of third parties as 
part of the ethical framework through which lawyers view their decisions 
and their advice to their clients would work better as an ethical aspiration 
that can inform a lawyer’s approach to ethical decisions than as a rule that 
could be a basis for disciplinary enforcement.210  This idea could be 
included by reintroducing something akin to the Code’s ethical 
considerations or by incorporating it into the current Preamble to the Model 
Rules, which does set out the broad framework regarding a lawyer’s role.211  
For example, the Preamble could be revised to include this concept in 
Paragraphs 2 and 9 of the Preamble.  The proposed additional language is 
in italics: 
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As 
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s 
legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the 
client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others. As an 
evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client’s legal affairs and reporting about 
them to the client or to others.  [As an officer of the legal system, a lawyer shall 
be loyal to the client.  This should not, however preclude a lawyer from 
considering, as part of the lawyer’s ethical decision-making, the rights and 
interests of third parties that may be adversely affected by either the lawyer’s 
conduct or the client’s conduct.]212 
**** 
[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are 
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a 
lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own 
interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living. The 
Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. 
Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of 
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the 
exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer’s obligation 
zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds 
of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward 
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all persons involved in the legal system.  [These principles also include the 
lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the legal system.  While a lawyer’s duty of 
loyalty to the client is usually paramount, the lawyer should consider whether a 
course of conduct taken by a client or on behalf of a client would adversely 
impact the interests of third parties.  There are many times when this outcome is 
legitimate, but sometimes it can be a sign of illegal conduct by a client or 
misconduct by a lawyer.  Even if the law allows for an outcome that adversely 
impacts the interests of third parties, a lawyer should still discuss with his or her 
client whether such an outcome is the right thing to do.]213 
B. Reforms to Legal Education 
In addition to considering revisions to the Model Rules, legal 
education would be an important component in training lawyers to consider 
the impact of their conduct on the interests of third parties as part of their 
ethical decision-making.  In the wake of Watergate there have been 
differing views about the importance that law schools have historically 
placed on educating and training students in the matter of ethics.214  Legal 
education continues to receive some criticism about how it teaches 
professionalism, which includes education about the law of lawyering, in 
addition to matters of morality and character.215  Some legal commentators 
have criticized legal education, particularly the area of legal ethics, as being 
too morally neutral.216  One law student commented, “[W]e don’t focus on 
what is right, we just talk about what is legally feasible.”217 
One commentator suggested that part of the circumstances leading to 
Watergate included legal education’s agenda of banishing emotionality 
from lawyers’ work.218  The Carnegie Foundation’s 2007 report on legal 
education concluded that “[t]he kind of personal maturity that graduates 
need in order to practice law with integrity and a sense of purpose requires 
not only skills, but qualities such as compassion, respectfulness and 
commitment.”219 
Legal ethics pedagogy may benefit from the growing dialogue about 
teaching law students emotional intelligence.  Emotional intelligence has 
been defined as “a set of emotional competencies involving self-awareness 
of emotions, empathetic awareness of the emotions of others, and the 
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ability to use this awareness to influence the behavior of others.”220  For 
purposes of this discussion, the concept of empathy is the most important 
and the following is a helpful definition: 
“Empathy encompasses several related phenomena: (1) feeling the 
emotions of another; (2) understanding another’s situation or experience; 
and (3) taking actions based on another’s situation.  Empathy involves 
ways of knowing and understanding and can serve as a catalyst for either 
action or restraint.”221  In this broader view, empathy is an essential 
element of the concept of emotional intelligence.  “Empathy, when it 
primarily involves sympathy, leads to helping behaviors and even 
altruism . . . .  So viewed, that aspect of empathy has little role in actual 
adversarial proceedings.”222 
Research supports the proposition that lawyers with high levels of 
emotional competencies are more successful persuaders, communicators, 
and influencers and should be “more likely to give high priority to other 
interests, such as improving the justice system.”223  This is important 
because lawyers have the daily opportunity in their practice “to set by their 
example, and even induce by their persuasion, standards of truth and right 
in our society at large[.]”224 
Much work has been done on teaching legal ethics in context by using 
problems that give students an opportunity to address ethical issues through 
different roles.225  Problem-based teaching has also been identified as an 
important tool for teaching emotional intelligence.226  While current 
scholarship focuses largely on emotional intelligence regarding a lawyer’s 
understanding of his or her emotions and the client’s emotions,227 one way 
to foster the expansion of legal morality is to include, in legal ethics 
education, problems that focus on recognizing and empathizing with the 
interests of third parties.  “To a large extent people behave as they are 
expected to behave, and their expectations arise less from what they are 
told than from the examples they observe.”228 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no one explanation that can account for lawyers’ improper 
involvement in Watergate or for other events that have involved lawyers, 
harmed third parties, and tarnished the reputation of the legal profession.  
ABA President Robert Meserve suggested that “[t]he first lesson of 
Watergate for us then may be that we must constantly preserve our 
professional independence and detachment — not only from the 
overzealous client who seeks what is improper, but from the urgings of our 
own ambition and self-interest.”229  As this article has argued, one way to 
do this may be to steer lawyers back to being morally accountable actors, 
but in a way that provides specific guidance about what it means to be 
“moral.”  Considering the impact of a course of action on the interests of 
third parties is one aspect of being a moral lawyer.  The profession could 
start to inculcate the consideration of the interests of third parties as a 
component of a lawyer’s decision-making process by reforms to the Model 
Rules and to legal education.  In doing so, lawyers may be better enabled to 
fulfill one commentator’s reflections about the role of the lawyer post-
Watergate: 
We are not the keeper of our clients’ consciences, but neither are we mere 
technicians whose sole function is to assure that legal limitations are narrowly 
observed. . . .  We fulfill the finest standards of our profession when our 
informed legal opinion is supplemented by judicious counsel.  Without 
undertaking to preach to our clients, we can encourage them to ask us not just “is 
it legal?” but “is it right?”230 
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